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DISCUSSION AFTER THE SPEECHES OF GREG MASTEL
AND BRADLY CONDON
COMMENT, PROFESSOR KING: We wanted to give Alejandro
Nadal an opportunity to add a few thoughts. He is not on the program,
but he is here. The important thing is to take advantage of a Mexican
presence here.
COMMENT, MR. NADAL: First of all, let me tell you that I have
enjoyed very much the meeting today and yesterday, I have learned a
lot. I want to thank you for inviting me here. It is really a very, very
refreshing experience to be talking to a group of lawyers and petitioners
of law, and get away from economists.
What I want to say today, very rapidly, is that we have to be less
naive about NAFTA and about the economic model that underlies
NAFTA. This goes for Mexico, too. My remarks are going to be focused on Mexico. We have to look with better lenses. We have to look
at the asymmetries within the three countries. We have to take a very
hard look at the economic realities of Mexico, the trends, and the perspectives of future evolution of that economy.
I think I tried to convince you yesterday, I do not know if I succeeded, that the economic model in Mexico needs some important
changes. The model is not performing well. We have been having mediocre growth for the last fifteen years.
By "the model," I am referring to a set of policies that was implemented at least since 1987 or 1988, in a very decisive way, and since
then the results in terms of the growth of the GDP are very disappointing. In addition to that, there are very serious distortions in the Mexican
economy, and that is what I tried to convey yesterday. On top of all
that, this is the model that generated the 1994 crisis, and that was a
very critical event. We have not been listening to the signals coming out
of that event.
What was the nature of the 1994 crisis? This is a very relevant
question, because we have not done anything to change or reform the
model that is associated with the peso crisis of 1994. Why did that
crisis take place? People say it was human error, failure to devalue at
the right time. I say it is intrinsic to the model that you have to despond the time for devaluation as long as you can. The model has in-
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consistencies and internal contradictions that imply essentially that you
do not have the possibility to render your internal adjustment and development compatible with your external economy.
Balance-of-payments crises are bound to come back again, maybe
not as severe as the 1994 crisis was, because people will pay a little bit
more attention to where it is going, that is true. But the tension between
your current accounts in balances and your internal accounts, your internal economy, is going to be there, and therefore balance of payments
crises, even moderate ones, are bound to be a chronic disease for the
Mexican economy with this model.
I have asked the organizers of the conference to give me a chance
to deliver copies of the paper I wrote on balance-of-payments provisions
in the GATr and NAFTA. Balance-of-payments crises, even moderate
ones, are bound to reappear. The graphs and tables I showed yesterday
revealed that there is a trend for that to happen again.
The 1997 forecast for the Mexican economy is that we are going to
have a five billion dollar deficit in our current account again, in spite of
the massive adjustments of 1995. You have this problem reappearing
very rapidly. This means that you need to cover your balances, attracting short-term investments. This raises your domestic rates of interest.
That affects domestic sectors, investment growth, et cetera, and those are
the types of contradictions I am talking about. We do not have time to
go into that, so if you have questions, we can come back to that. But
the point is we are bound to have the balance-of-payments crises again.
What does the NAFTA say about balance-of-payments provisions? In
1947 when the GATT was launched, the people who drafted it saw that
there was a balance-of-payments crisis in European countries. This was
after the war. It was clear that we had to do something about balanceof-payments crises. If a balance-of-payments crisis is triggered or driven
by your trade deficit, the people who drafted GATT concluded, it is
certainly more for exceptions. Let us allow member countries, the contracting parties with GATT, to have the right under Article 12 of the
GATT to temporarily curtail imports. You can even introduce things like
tariffs or COLAS, quantitative controls of imports, and tariff surcharges,
although legal coverage for tariff surcharges was not very clear under
GATT Article 12.
You did have the right to introduce quantitative restrictions on a
transitory or an exceptional basis. You had to have consultations with
your fellow GATT members, but that was it. You did not have the
chance to restrict imports when you were facing the balance-of-payments
crisis.
In the Uruguay Round, this was reaffirmed. There was a lot of
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controversy about the role of tariff surcharges. Are they covered by this
regime of import restrictions under exceptional basis or not? The Uruguay Round, ratified in Marakesh in 1994, clarified that by stating that
there was an understanding of balance-of-payments provisions that once
and for all does what could not be done in the Tokyo Round. It clarifies things quite a bit. You can use tariff surcharges to limit these imports, and you can even use quantitative restrictions. You can use tariff
surcharges on a differential basis. So you do not have to play it across
the board, you can hit consumption goods with higher tariff surcharges
than intermediate goods or capital goods. That is essentially what was
said in the Uruguay Round.
Let us come to NAFTA now. In 1994 the process exploded. We
looked at NAFTA, Chapter 21, Article 2104. For the sake of time, I
will spell it out very briefly. Essentially, Article 2104, Section 5, Paragraph D says that there are no exceptions. You will not be able to have
tariff surcharges. You will not be able to have import COLAS, permits,
or licenses. That is it. So the Chapter on exceptions for balance-of-payments reasons states that there are no exceptions.
Before that little phrase I just quoted, Article 2104(5)(D), what
NAFTA does is force you to go to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) if you have a problem on your balance of payments. You go to
the IMF and talk to them about exchange restrictions. This is a smokescreen, in that Article, I think for one reason. It is totally redundant.
You do that anyway if you want to impose exchange restrictions. You
go to the IMF. That is an IMF jurisdiction. It is not GATf; it is not
WTO; and it certainly would not be NAFTA. You have to go there
anyway.
But import restrictions, which is the normal thing that you would
find under the heading of balance-of-payments restrictions, are not exchange restrictions. They are import and trade restrictions. Therefore,
NAFTA says, you go to the IMF, and the IMF will tell you that you
cannot have exchange of restrictions. Article 8 of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF would interdict that. And then you cannot have import
restrictions either because NAFTA says you cannot do it. By the way, if
you look at the Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement, import restrictions
were possible under the Free Trade Agreement.
When Mexico joins in that regime, and you have a Free Trade
Agreement for the entire region, it is fairly obvious that the Americans,
at least, want to prevent Mexicans from being able to restrict imports in
the case of balance-of-payments crises. When that happens, you are
doing the same thing for Canada.
There are two countries in North America that have resorted to
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import restrictions and tariff surcharges under Article 12 of the GATT.
One of those countries is Canada, and the other is the United States. It
is interesting. But the country that was really targeted was Mexico. So
the Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement had it; the Maastricht Treaty has
it. This means that, even if you have deep economic integration, it still
made sense to have access to the possibility of resorting to import restrictions when you have a balance-of-payments crisis. I urge you to
look at Maastricht. It is very interesting.
The legal implication is that we cannot use import restrictions for
balance-of-payments crises anywhere because it has to be nondiscriminatory. We cannot target China, Japan, or Korea. That would be GATT7
inconsistent. But if it is forbidden in NAFTA among NAFIA parties,
that means it is forbidden for all of our trading partners. This is very
relevant in the case of Mexico, because a huge chunk of the trade deficit is not related to our NAFTA partners whatsoever, but it is related to
imports from Japan or European countries, or from China. So here we
have a problem. We have a model that may be generating chronic balance-of-payments crises, and we have a treaty that says you cannot
resort to import restrictions.
I prepared a scenario on what the effect would be of import restrictions on an exceptional basis. In 1994, it would have been an effective
way to prevent the peso crisis, and, in fact, it would have aided Mexico
to meet its financial obligation without resorting to the dollar-denominated Mexican Treasury bonds, which was really what started the Mexican
monetary authority.
We need to change the economic model, and I think whatever is in
NAFTA, that has to be changed as a result of NAFTA. I think we have
to take a second very hard look and we have to improve what we have.
QUESTION, MR. EDWARDS: I have one question. Alejandro, I
think there was one error with the IMF that relates to Article 8, Paragraph 2(A). It deals with exchange restrictions. The IMF does permit
exchange restrictions by decision of the Executive Board. They have
done it for a large number of countries. In a book I wrote I went
through those, so it is wrong to say they are not permitted. They just
have to go through that procedure.
COMMENT, MR. NADAL: You are right.
QUESTION, MR. MURPHY: Alejandro, one of the things you note
in NAFTA in the investment chapter allows investors to remit money,
dividends, or whatever. In the event of another crisis in Mexico with the
balance of payments, do you think that Mexico should have the right to
restrict those remittances, or would that just go back to the IMF and be
considered exchange controls?
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ANSWER, MR. NADAL: That would take you to IMF exchange
restrictions. I do not think we need to close the economy. I do not like
exchange restrictions. We tried those in the eighties, and it was a total
failure to the sense that the economy backfired in some respects.
I think one of the things we have to do is to render the Mexican
economy less dependent on your hot money portfolio investments. This
is why I think that the way we deregulated trade was too fast, too
abrupt, and nonselective. That created a trade deficit plus the debt burden. That was rescheduled in the early Salinas years.
There was some relief out of that, but it came back again when
your interest rates increased. With the services for debt increases, and
then the Peso crisis in 1994, the outstanding total public debt in Mexico
neared one hundred billion dollars. If you add another sixty or seventy
billion by the private sector, you are paying thirteen or fourteen billion
dollars a year for interest. That is not compatible with growth objectives
for the Mexican economy.
We have to do something with our creditors. We need to tell them
that we want to pay. They want us to pay. We need to talk about another exercise that we should do. It can be done. There is a lot of literature about that.
So you have to do something about imports; something about your
trade deficit; and do something about the debt service. That will make
you less dependent on hot money portfolio investments. And you and I
were talking about the Chilean experience after the crisis. It is not only
how to arrange these short-term portfolio investments in the Chilean or
Mexican economic space, it is how to be less dependent on them.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: I think it is very original, very
interesting to say we ought to get closer to Europe. I guess what I was
concerned about is not in terms of growth potential. Is there not greater
potential in Latin America than in Europe? You proposed a Transatlantic
Free Trade Agreement arrangement. Did you want to comment on that?
I think it would be easier, perhaps, to get through Congress. You
worked on the Hill quite a lot, would it be easier to get through Congress? There would not be the problem of the differentials in labor and
all that. But I wonder if the real potential is in South America.
ANSWER, MR. MASTEL: Actually, that is a good question. I had
not had a chance to study it in more detail, but I would like to throw
out a couple of notes which I think would have to be taken somewhat
critically. First of all, I disagree that the problem in Mexico in the balance-of-payments crisis was a trade problem. It was a result of not
enough import restrictions. Secondly, politically speaking, if Mexico had
proposed trade restrictions on U.S. exports in 1994, the NAFTA would
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now be history. I mean, the political situation in the United States is
such that those kind of restrictions just are not tenable. If anything, perhaps, it makes sense to go back to the GATr and allow a safeguard
that applied to other trading partners, but not to the United States and
not to NAFTA partners.
By way of introduction to answering this question, though, it seems
to me that one of the real problems with the NAFTA, economically
speaking, is that you are trying to bridge an economic gap between two
systems that are at different levels of development. In some sense, I
would say the peso crisis was really a result of different levels of development, different economic systems, which make trade sometimes difficult to conduct.
That would be primary, when I think about looking to economies
like Europe as opposed to Latin America, in terms of future free-trade
partners. As I said, the United States and Canada were easily able to
adopt the free-trade system, or relatively easy to develop the free-trade
system, in economic terms. I think the United States, Canada, and
Europe did the same.
Moving south, you have the risk of confronting the same problem of
differing levels of economic development. I think this can result in
problems that, and I am not sure there is a political consensus in the
United States to allow that movement in that direction. I think there is
political consensus, however, for trade with developed countries where
there is less of a differential.
I think there is substantial economic growth potential between the
United States and Europe. As I said, you should only have trade between developed countries and developing countries. It makes perfect
economic sense, and it would generate large benefits, which is kind of a
burden in what you were saying. And I agree that the problem with the
theory is that it ignores the fact that there are different economic systems and different legal systems. I think the lesson we can learn from
the U.SiCanada FTA is that similar legal systems and similar economic
systems make the benefits of free trade more easily realized, which is
the primary case for looking to Europe as opposed to Latin America
where you could conceivably deal with more peso-crisis-like problems.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR KING: And it makes it easy to sell in
Congress.
QUESTION, MR. O'GRADY: I was thinking of the book Professor
Galbraith wrote a few years ago on the economics of underdevelopment.
He would probably think this was simplistic, but the basic point was
that the best way to develop the underdeveloped world is incrementally
to get it to adhere to the critical mass of development that already exists
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in the world. So that sort of thinking does tend to suggest that alliances
with Europe would be easier.
But assuming we do not get them and we are thinking about Mexico, how long do you contemplate that these import restrictions would
continue? Is this not a two-way street? Is it not a street whereby Mexico uses a Free Trade Agreement to solve an existing balance-of-payments problem by improving their exports and keeping their imports at
about the same levels? How do you make this saleable or attractive to
your free trade partners?
ANSWER, MR. NADAL: First of all, I think we have to clarify a
couple of things. When I talk about import restrictions and the need to
change that Article in the NAFA and allow for exceptions, people
might think, this guy is advocating that we leave the economic model
because it is going to be generating a chronic balance-of-payments crisis, and then we go get some insurance or use a slice of the pie, which
is Article 2104. I mean for us to look at the emergency or exceptional
measures, and open the door for exceptions, because the Mexicans are
going to be having chronic balance-of-payments crises. I am not advocating that.
I am saying that is one example in which there are problems in
NAFTA related to the underlying economic model of Mexico. I think
we have to change the economic model in Mexico, we have to be less
dependent on trade, on these portfolio investments, to finance our current account of balances.
And yes, I disagree with you, Greg. If you look at the figures, the
trade deficit is really gigantic, and it was gigantic in 1993 and 1994.
This is why people said you had to devalue. You had an appreciative
peso because of all these capital inflows coming in, but also because it
was part of your anti-inflation policy, and that generates a colossal
unsustainable trade deficit, and that implies that you have to do something with your relative crises; in other words, you have to devalue.
My point is, it was very trade-disruptive to devalue. If you look at
what happened in 1995, the reversal of the trade deficit that we had,
and then to go to a trade surplus in 1995, we are talking about huge
and colossal amounts of money there. That implied a lot of disruption
in trade. In fact, you guys were running a deficit with Mexico again in
1995 and 1996.
My point, to summarize, is we do have to change the economic
model; we have to reform that economic model. By this I am not saying let us go back to the 1970s; I am not advocating that whatsoever.
We do not have to close the economy.
This is why lawyers think in terms of exceptions. It is better to
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open a door for exceptions than to close it and make sure people are
not going to violate that law because there are no exceptions. I think
that is the legal mentality. You think in terms of an escape route or
something.
But we do have to take a hard look at the crisis, at the model, and
then take measures that would change that economic model. Whatever is
in NAFTA has to be changed. I leave it up to lawyers and others to
figure that one out.
As for the political liability, I do not know. I am not a politician. I
am just pointing out the technical necessity. If there is no technical
necessity to change the model, then the question about political liability
becomes irrelevant. You do not have a political liability.
But if there is a necessity to change the model, then I say, let us
take a hard look at the figures that show us what is going on in Mexico
today and not start asking whether or not the Mexican economy is
growing. What does that mean? It means that your export sector and
your import sector are growing at spectacular rates while the domestic
sector is stagnant.
Those distortions are not sustainable in the long run. Something is
going to happen. People are not going to be there with their arms
crossed waiting for the miracle of the market system to come one day
in a sort of trickle-down thing and then in the year 2025 we will have
some effects. People are not going to wait.
QUESTION, MR. TUTTLE: I was listening to Greg Mastel's comments focusing on the Transatlantic arrangement and also thinking about
APEC, in which Canada has been involved. If you get too many of
these agreements, then you are detracting from the whole WTO. One of
the examples or one of the restrictions that Greg is talking about is,
when you start dealing with the WTO, it tends to try to equate all the
economies, even when you are dealing with intellectual property. Maybe
there needs to be a two-tiered approach to the WTO. I think we have
emerged into a WTO that tries to get everybody up to the same speed,
and I am just not sure that it is feasible.
ANSWER, MR. MASTEL: Actually, there is an old idea called
GATT Plus. It is a core agreement wanting to go further. Trade liberalization would go forward. I think it is a good idea. And in some
sense, a TAFIA is another version of GATT Plus. I think it makes
good sense, and I think it is another way of addressing the same issues.
That said, one of the reasons I was expressing some skepticism
earlier is, I would not want to see us move backwards. In other words,
we can take a group of countries that want to go above the WTO and
negotiate an agreement that goes above it. I do not think it makes sense
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for developing countries to go below the current level. It is a long debate.
It is my view that trade restrictions are not a solution to developing
economic problems. In fact, they have more to do with the problem,
and, in essence, are the cause of it. We can debate Mexico in more
detail, but as I say, I think it does make sense for the countries that can
move forward more quickly to do so.
Without dropping the current level, I think TAFTA is another way
to look at a GATT Plus kind of arrangement, which I think makes good
economic sense, and probably good political sense too. There is a bicycle theory of trade. Maybe you have heard about it. The idea is that if
you keep trade liberalization agreements going, you keep momentum
moving in that direction. I think there is some truth to that theory. That
being the case, I think we need to look for what the most logical liberalization perspectives, or liberalization possibilities are. It seems to me
TAFTA or GATT Plus is an idea that came of age ten years ago, but
its time is now long past, and so I think it is a good approach.
QUESTION, MR. DATU: Speaking on the Transatlantic idea, it
certainly passed the three lenses test that Pat Murphy took us through
yesterday; the economic integration, economic advantages, the perspective on it as well as the cultural advantage. I am wondering if there is
another lens we ought to look through for this issue, that one being
international politics.
We have, I think, come a long way in the last few years. We have
managed to show many countries around the world that the way to
progress economically is through free market economy principles and
liberal trade, and that effort has been a multilateral approach and multilateral effort. And, indeed, if we end up doing a Transatlantic bloc, one
has to wonder what implications that has for the north/south dialogue,
whether in fact it may result in a polarization of the world and what the
implications would be for international politics. There may be, indeed,
certain countries left out of the Transatlantic bloc that may use that to
their advantage to either cause other countries to move away from the
free market orientation, or indeed result in a formation of a bloc that
might see things in a very polarly opposite way. Is there a danger of
that?
ANSWER, MR. CONDON: I think that is a good argument, something we really need to consider in a Transatlantic free trade area. I
have a couple of thoughts on that.
First of all, it seems more likely to me that the result of a Transatlantic Free trade area is the leadership it would demonstrate. It would
demonstrate how far liberalization could go and what directions could be
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taken to the United States and Canada. It would be kind of a pathbreaker. And it would also create a political incentive for countries to
be part of the bloc. And so there are a lot of incentives in the other
direction.
That is it. As I mentioned in my remarks, I believe there is likely to
be, in the next ten years, a clash of economic systems, as there has
been in the last ten years. But I think it could become more intense as
China enters a very large economy with a very different way of looking
at economics. But I think TAFTA is actually a way to prepare for that
struggle. I think it will be inevitable, I think there will be a battle of
the hearts and minds of the developing world among the competing
economic systems. And I think, if the Western economic system is to
prevail, it should look as strong as possible and present as solid a front
as possible. One of the side benefits of TAFTA is it would allow those
countries that subscribe to a Western model of market economics to
work together a little more closely and hopefully to develop a common
face to prevent the struggle. Because as I say, I think there is inevitably
going to be in part a south/north dispute. I think the growth of the
world, and certainly the Western economies, have a big stake in the
outcome of that struggle.

